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ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDING
OFFICIALS TODAY
Charles H. Koch, Jr. •

Introduction
loyd Musolf offers the results of a survey that helps us see what administrative
presiding officials were like and how they viewed their job as they began
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APAY in 1948. As it happens, the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) directed a study of the
"administrative judiciary" (ACUS Study Group) in 1992. 2 Several surveys of
presiding officials were conducted as part of that study. Thus, we have recent
surveys of attitudes and perceptions. 3 The results of those surveys might help
illustrate the problems that have evolved since the Musolf survey.
As part of the study group, I assumed primary responsibility for its empirical
work. This responsibility gave me a very close look at the administrative law
judge (ALJ) corps. What I saw was, to put it bluntly, alarming. My biases are
always with the government employees and officials, having been one myself.
Indeed, I dedicated my treatise to civil servants. 4 Still, the more I dealt with the
ALJ corps, the more concerned I became. The system has some very serious
personnel problems and real, practical solutions are being supplanted by theoretical ones. Our survey provides some of the insights necessary to begin adjusting
the debate.
The first step in confronting the existing problems requires a shift from the current
tendency to view the system from the presiding officials' perspective to seeing it from
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• Woodbridge Professor of Law, College of William and Mary School of Law; B.A. 1966,
University of Maryland; J.D. 1969, George Washington University; LL.M. 1975, University of
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This article is in part based on several surveys conducted for the Administrative Conference of the
United States in 1992 of which the author was a consultant. The views expressed herein, however,
are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Administrative Conference, its membership, or the other members of its study team.
1. 5 u.s.c. § 556 (1988).
2. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1992 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS
771 [hereinafter ACUS STUDY).
3. We conducted two surveys: one surveyed those classified as ALJs, and the other, those presiding officers not falling within the category of ALJ. !d. at app. IV(A), (D) [hereinafter 1992 ALJ
Survey and AJ Survey, respectively). Belinda Hatzenbuhler, currently with Lyon & McManus,
Orlando, Florida, provided invaluable assistance in developing, administering, and evaluating the
surveys.
4. CHARLES H. KocH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE (1985).
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the citizens' perspective, from which the problems look quite different. Unfortunately,
the ACUS Study Group could not find the resources to survey the systems' clients
and their representatives. Much of those findings expressed below, then, are based
on testimony and other expressions by representatives of those groups.

Some Proposals
Considering that the first step must be to refocus the debate on the problems
of those who appear before these adjudicators, a number of reforms are necessary
to further or protect those interests. These reforms, however, are not the ones
currently being advocated because the presiding official organizations are dictating
the reform debate.
From my participation with the ACUS Study Group, I perceive that the problems involve the failure of an unacceptable number of presiding officials, particularly those in the privileged position of ALJ, to perform their function fairly and
with an acceptable level of competence and diligence. As with any large group,
there are poor performances and failures of integrity. Unlike other groups, those
responsible for the failures here are insulated from criticism. Aggravating the
situation is the fact that the individuals most often adversely affected are already
very disadvantaged people. We must find a way to monitor the presiding officials
so that these individuals are not subjected to breakdowns in the administrative
process.
In many cases, it is the agency that is trying to find ways to assure adequate
and fair performance by its presiding officials. Obviously, such efforts by the
agency may appear to challenge adjudicative independence and decisionmaking
freedom. For that reason, agency management, no matter how well intended, is
suspect and vulnerable. 5 An ACUS recommendation sought a monitoring method
that did not involve the agency administrators. Rather, it suggested the chief
ALJ s be given this responsibility. 6
A far better way to deal with the complaints against presiding officials would
be an independent monitoring system. This ombudsman approach meets the real
problems in the administrative judiciary. 7 Such a system would be far less intrusive
than any alternative and yet provide an effective avenue for correcting misconduct.
Such a system would be flexible enough to respond to individual situations with
well tailored remedies while protecting decisionmaking independence.
Moreover, the ombudsman system has the advantage of removing the complain-

5. It is interesting that, while the ALJs complained of the "Reagan monster" in the 1980s, they
had their most heated confrontation with the Carter administration. As the Clinton administration
begins to understand the impediment the ALJs have created for the delivery of government service
it can be expected to have the same difficulties.
6. The Federal Administrative Judiciary (Recommendation No. 92-7), I C.F.R. § 305.927(III)(B)(3) ( 1992).
7. Such monitoring would not be inconsistent with the concept of judges. The original ombudsmen were in fact designed to correct the abuses of judges, not administrative officials. See generally
WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN NINE CoUNTRIES (1966).
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ant from the center of the controversy. An ombudsman approach to citizen complaints does not require complainants to participate directly in the process, unless
they wish to participate to assure satisfactory resolution of the complaint. This
system will not place the burden on private citizens, and correction of problems
will not depend on the complainant's vigor and tenacity.
Remedies considered by the ombudsman can be active and flexible. In countries
with ombudsman systems, the ombudsman's investigations often vindicate the
bureaucrat. Where the ombudsman finds a problem, informal techniques generally suffice. 8 I expect a presiding official ombudsman to have much the same
experience. However, if informal devices are not sufficient in a particular case
then the ombudsman should be empowered to pursue more formal remedies.
An ombudsman system alone is not sufficient, however. For one thing, a reactive, complaint-driven system cannot adequately protect those who most need
protection and are the least likely to complain. Moreover, a complaint system
will rarely address consistently inadequate or incompetent performance. Also,
any such system necessarily contains many structural and psychological deterrents
to punishing ALJs for misconduct. Indeed, a complaint system is in place and
it does not work. While such a system can be vastly improved, it cannot solve
many of the problems.
In addition to an independent monitoring system, therefore, I would develop
a system of periodic reevaluation of ALJ s. This was proposed to the ACUS Study
Group and then again to the ACUS governing body. However, ACUS was only
willing to go so far as recommending internal periodic reevaluation. 9 I am convinced that periodic review by a body independent of both the agency and the ALJ s
will be the only meaningful way to adjust consistently inadequate and damaging
conduct. Unlike the current system, this approach will be sensitive to gradations
of poor performance rather than considering only the most egregious cases. In
addition, it will permit flexible remedies, commensurate with specific weaknesses
in the performance of individual ALJs.
Moreover, general, periodic evaluations would force the system to focus on
the positive as well as the negative. The evaluation process would create a device
for praising that large number of ALJs who conscientiously and competently
perform their duties. While none of us enjoy being evaluated, the good judges
should appreciate that the evaluation process will result in public recognition of
their performance in a way that is unfortunately absent in our current system.
Indeed, the evaluators should be instructed to readily praise good performance
as well as criticize bad performance.
The basic mechanics of my proposal would include a periodic review by an
impartial panel. 10 Any period would be somewhat arbitrary but I would recom8. !d.
9. I C.F.R. § 305.92-7(III)(B)(3) (1992).
10. A study conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) suggested evaluation of ALJs
by an independent panel of attorneys and, not surprisingly, almost three-quarters of the ALJ s disagreed
with this proposal. U.S. GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, SuRVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw OPERATIONS
response 10 (1978) [hereinafter GAO STUDY).
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mend a seven-year period. That period might be justified because it tends to be
the prescribed tenure of many commissioners and board members. However, I
would also consider an initial probation period of one year. A new ALJ would
not automatically be evaluated by a panel at the end of the probation period,
but if problems are discovered, then a panel should be convened to consider
continuation of the appointment.
The evaluation panels should be drawn from federal judges and magistrates.
Not only will judges be structurally independent but they will bring with them
an understanding of the judging function. Dr. Paula Burger, in her study of ALJ s,
observed: "[O]ne is struck by how many problems administrative law judges
share with the judges of our Article III courts. " 11 In addition to independence
and expertise, this mechanism has the incidental value of compelling an exchange
which will be of value to both sets of judges.
The ALJ organizations have been promoting another type of solution: the ALJ
panel or pool in which all the ALJ s are housed in one agency. Many ALJ s support
this idea. The 1992 ALJ Survey found that 79% wanted separation from the
agency. 12 Seventy-six percent thought the absence of a corps was a problem. 13
To me, the ALJ pool idea goes in exactly the wrong direction. First, it further
insulates the presiding officials from public scrutiny and solidifies the closed club
environment. Second, much of the problem is the well-entrenched, senior members of the ALJ corps who are most likely to control the ALJ pool. Some indication
of this problem surfaced from consideration of the Study Group's recommendation
to empower the chief ALJ s. The recommendation sought a type of peer evaluation
which could be accomplished without compromising independence. Many complained, however, that the chief ALJs were, themselves, a substantial threat to
ALJ independence. While many chief ALJs do perform well, others are overbearing and use their powers to control their colleagues. 14 It seems that an ALJ pool
run by ALJs would present a greater danger to the ALJs' independence than
anything the agency administrations could accomplish under current law.
Another drawback to the pool idea is that it fails to confront the real problem.
Clear benefits must be found in order to justify creating an entirely new structure
that would destroy the fundamental advantages of having expert decisionmakers
experienced with specialized processes. It is clear from the surveys, though, that
the ALJ problem is not structural.
It is not independence the ALJ slack but rather an effective individual grievance
procedure. While some individual feelings of threats to independent judgment
surfaced, such problems did not appear to be systemic. Therefore, a solution that

11. PAULA P. BuRGER, juDGEs IN SEARCH oF A CouRT: CHARACTERISTICS, FuNCTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF FEDERAL ADMINNISTRATIVE LAW jUDGES 362 (1984) (hereinafter BuRGER STUDY].
12. 1992 ALj Survey, supra note 3, response 23i.
13. /d., response 23k.
14. For example, the Labor Department recently brought personnel action against its chief ALj
for "abusing the powers of his office over a period of at least five years." Frank Swoboda, Labor
Dept. Trying to Oust Administrative Law judge: Nahum Lilt Accused of Abusing Powers of Office, WASH. PosT,
Feb. 12, 1994, at Cl.
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can target the problems more precisely may be of greater value with far less
negative potential. Perhaps the ombudsman system could not only protect the
public from the presiding officials but also protect the presiding officials from
oppressive agency management. This dual jurisdiction makes sense because most
of these problems arise from the agency attempting to correct inadequate or inappropriate performance. Moreover, as the surveys suggest, oppressive agency management problems involve individual situations. Where the agency management
goes too far in a particular case, the ombudsman could step in.
An ombudsman could investigate complaints and pursue a wide range of methods
for correcting either presiding officials or agency misconduct. Again, where the
problem does involve presiding official misconduct, the independent authority of
the ombudsman will avoid challenges of management oppression. As to an ALJ's
complaint against the agency, the ombudsman's options should range from informal guidance to the power to take formal action against the offending agency official.
Still, much of the tension is caused by the reality that many ALJs are not
performing their functions adequately or, sometimes, with integrity. Correcting
such individual problems will always create controversy. The correction process
must be fair to the employees, but this sensitivity does not diminish the obvious
need for such correction processes.
All of the above proposals that address this problem involve somewhat ex post
solutions. The selection process, however, provides the initial opportunity to improve ALJ performance. The selection process has been discussed in depth in the
ACUS Study and elsewhere. 15 But I wish to emphasize one very strong conclusion:
The present ALJ corp simply has too many people who should not be in a position
of judging others, especially those with no power. The selection process must be
designed to assure that citizens meet the right kind of individual when they come
before the government. I would go so far as to suggest serious consideration of
sophisticated personality testing.

Scope of the Study
ALJ s have been surveyed on a number of occasions. We found four studies all
completed about a decade ago to be particularly useful. 16 Our survey endeavored to
update much of the information gleaned from these four studies. 17
15. ACUS STUDY, supra note 2, at 931.
16. The most useful study was conducted by Paul Burger in 1978. Set BuRGER STUDY, supra note
II. Another useful study was conducted by Amid Sharon for the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM). Set AMIEL T. SHARON, VALIDATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW jUDGE EXAMINATION
(1980) [hereinafter SHARON STUDY]. As its title suggests, the Sharon Study's primary goal was to
develop the basis for evaluation of the ALj examination process. A third study that contributed
some useful information was undertaken by the General Accounting Office. Set GAO STUDY, supra
note 10. The fourth study, which focused on the SSA, sent the questionnaire in 1982 and published
the results in 1985. See DoNNA P. CoFER, juDGES, BuREAUCRATS, AND THE QuESTION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY OF THE SoCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING PROCESS (1985) [hereinafter
COFER STUDY].
17. In our survey, we tried to categorize the ALj s along functional lines. As we knew, and the
ALjs pointed out in responding, these categories are no more than approximations. See 1992 ALj
Survey, supra note 3. Many ALjs preside at hearings involving several of these functions. Nonetheless,
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We sent our survey to some 1150 sitting ALJs and 610 responded (about 53%).
We compiled the data in three different forms. 18 First are the responses from all
ALJ s surveyed. 19 Second are the responses from Social Security Administration
(SSA) ALJs. 20 Third are the responses from non-SSA ALJs. 21
Forty-five years is a long time and much has happened since then. 22 One major
development is that Musolf s hearing examiners have become "judges," specifically, administrative law judges. However, the federal system utilizes some 2700
presiding officials who are not classified as ALJ s. They are not covered by the
AP A provisions regulating ALJ s and otherwise do not acquire the privileges of
ALJs. John Frye called these "administrative judges" (AJs) and for convenience
that term will be used here. 23 There are no studies of AJ s similar to those of
ALJs listed above. Thus, in order to compare the information about working
environments and attitudes that we had for ALJs, we surveyed a selected sample
of AJ s. To the extent possible, we attempted to match the basic questions asked
in the four ALJ surveys and our own ALJ survey.
Because of limited resources, we restricted our survey to a representative sampling of "A] s." For this survey, we selected six agencies that employed a large
number of AJs: Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Merit System Protection Board (MSPB), Board of
Patent Appeals/Interferences (BPA), Department of Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), Defense Department (DISCR), Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (ASBCA), Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Trademark),
we wanted to be able to group responses according to functional categories that exist in the administrative process generally. These categories are:

Functional Category
Civil Rights Enforcement
Health and Safety
Environmental
Securities and Commodities
Trade Regulation
Labor Relations
Licensing and Ratemaking
Program Grants and Resource Management
Individual Economic Support
A. SSA
B. Other

Agencies
-

HUD
OSHRC, NTSB, FMSHRC, DEA, FDA, DOT
(Coast Guard & Office of Secretary)
EPA
SEC,CFTC
FTC, USITC, USPS, USDA, Commerce
NLRB, FLRA, MSPB
FCC, FERC, ICC, FMC, NRC
SBA, Education, HHS (Dept. Appeals), Interior
SSA
Labor

It was particularly necessary to separate SSA ALJs from the others. Judges in that agency so dominate

the pool that we needed to segregate their responses where appropriate.
18. These forms are reproduced with the final statistics in the ACUS Study and reference will
be made to the responses printed in that study. ACUS STUDY, supra note 2, at app. IV(A)-(D).
19. These responses are contained in the 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3.
20. ACUS STUDY, supra note 2, at app. IV(B) [hereinafter 1992 ALJ Survey, SSA only].
21. ACUS STUDY, supra note 2, at app. IV(C) [hereinafter 1992 ALJ Survey, non-SSA].
22. Scalia chronicled the "fiasco" in the conversion. Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco-A Reprise,
47 u. CHI. L. REV. 57 (1979).
23. John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal Government, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 261 (1992) [hereinafter Frye Study].
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and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board
Panel. AJs from these agencies provided 264 responses out of 380 requests or a
24
response rate of 69% .
Below is an effort to organize the data acquired through these surveys so as to
help identify some of the problems. This data is grouped according to problem
areas which might be explored. Where appropriate, I have compared the 1992
findings with those in the four surveys conducted a decade ago, particularly those
by Burger. 25
PRESIDING OFFICIALs' PERCEPTION OF THE PoTENTIAL CHALLENGE To THEIR
INDEPENDENCE, AND REALISTIC RESPONSES

Lawyers become very anxious when a process does not follow a familiar form.
Yet, the essence of the administrative process is tailoring procedures to meet
specific decisionmaking needs. Lawyers instinctively rebel against these "deviations'' from the norm and hence a natural tension always exists in the administrative process. For this reason, reform in administrative process must always test
for overcommitment to legal tradition.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has consistently supported procedural flexibility. For example, in Withrow v. Larkin, 26 the Court said that a process was not
defective merely because administrative adjudicators engaged in functions that
would be traditionally separate. A defective process required proof of actual bias,
not merely the absence of familiar structure. 27 Similarly, in McClure v. Schweiker, 28
the Court refused to invalidate a process just because the entity hiring the adjudicators had some stake in the outcome. It again required proof of actual bias. 29 Thus,
in practice, administrative adjudicators are afforded much leeway in decisionmaking.
Actual independence is crucial; thus we closely considered federal adjudicators'
opinions about the challenges to independence. The 1992 survey inquired into
actual interference in ALJ decisionmaking in several different ways. 3° First, it
asked the general question as to whether ALJs perceived any "threats to independent judgment.' ' 31 It also asked the specific question of whether they perceived
"pressure for different decisions. " 32 We also asked other questions that related
to independence.
A decade ago, Burger found very little evidence of challenges to ALJ indepen24. The ACUS Study also published the results of this survey and that source is referred to herein.
See A] Survey, supra note 3.
25. See BuRGER STUDY, supra note 11; CoFER STUDY, supra note 16; GAO STUDY, supra note 10;
SHARON STUDY, supra note 16.
26. 421 u.s. 35 (1975).
27. !d.
28. 456 u.s. 188 (1982).
29. !d.
30. In surveying attitudes, it is useful to inquire into the same information in different ways.
This check seemed particularly important in the 1992 ACUS Study because of the obvious connection
between the study and actual recommendations.
31. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 14m.
32. !d., response 14h.
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dence. As to the question concerning threats to independent judgment, only 1.5%
of the non-SSA ALJs responded that it was a significant problem and another 1%
responded that it was somewhat of a problem. 33 Thus, 97.5% of the non-SSA ALJs
responded that lack of independence was not a problem. As to the question of pressure for different decisions, only 1% of the non-SSA ALJ s responded that it was a
significant problem and 1.9% responded that it was somewhat of a problem. Thus,
97.1% of the non-SSA ALJ s responded that such interference was not a problem.
34
The SSA ALJ s, however, felt their independence was more threatened.
The 1992 ALJ Survey did not find as positive a situation. Fifteen percent of
the non-SSA ALJ s responded that threats to independence were a problem, with
8% saying this was frequently a problem. 35 Nine percent responded that pressure
to make different decisions was a problem and 4% found it to be a frequent
problem. 36 As with the Burger study, the SSA ALJ s expressed more concern:
33% of the SSA ALJs found threats to independence to be a problem, with 21%
saying this was a frequent problem. 37 Twenty-six percent found pressure to make
different decisions, with 10% finding it to be a frequent problem. 38
Because AJs have no formal protection, one might expect them to express a
far higher level of anxiety. However, AJs reported less of a problem than ALJs.
39
Ninety-one percent of the AJs described themselves as independent. About 70%
reported that threats to independent judgment were not a problem, with 18%
reporting that this was occasionally a problem and 10% reporting that it was
frequently a problem. 40 About 80% reported that pressure for different decisions
was not a problem and most of the remainder reported that it was only occasionally
a problem. 41 Only 2% reported that it was frequently a problem. 42
The contrast between the AJ and ALJ attitudes is significant because the AJ s
have none of the structural protections afforded ALJ s. Thus, we asked the AJ s
to compare their position with that of ALJs. They divided nearly equally among
greater, the same, or lesser, regarding independence from agency supervision and
authority. 43 These findings add support to the notion that structural protections are
33. BURGER STUDY, supra note 11, at 365.
34. While most SSA ALJs did not perceive the specific problem of pressure for different decisions,
almost half perceived the more vague problem of threats to independence. As to the more specific
question of pressure for different decisions, 6. 7% of the SSA ALJ s found it to be a significant problem
and 12% found it to be somewhat of a problem. As to the more general question of threats to
independence, 27.9% of the SSA ALJs found it to a significant problem and 16.7% found it to be
somewhat of a problem. Thus, only 55.4% of the SSA ALJs felt no threats to their independence.
!d. at 365. The Cofer Study confirms the existence of this perception on the part of SSA ALJs. She
reported that 70.1% of the SSA agreed that there was agency pressure against allowances. CoFER
STUDY, supra note 16, at 223. This pressure was not overt or direct, however. !d. at 171.
35. 1992 ALJ Survey, non-SSA, supra note 21, response 14m.
36. !d., response 14h.
37. 1992 ALJ Survey, SSA only, supra note 20, response 14m.
38. !d., response 14h.
39. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 23c.
40. !d., response 24m.
41. !d., response 24h.
42. !d., response 24h.
43. !d., responses 28a, b.
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not important to a feeling of independence and perhaps to actual independence.
In short, from the data, I must conclude that both a sense of independence and
actual independence derive from other sources.
The contrast between past and current attitudes and between ALJ s and AJ s
held up when we asked whether they had experienced pressure to do things "that
are against their better judgment." The 1992 ALJ Survey shows that 34% of
the ALJ s believed they were asked to do things that are against their better judgment, with 11% being frequently asked to do so. 44 Thirteen percent of the SSA
ALJ s reported that they were frequently asked to do things against their better
judgment and another 29% were occasionally asked to do so. 45 Only 6% of the
non-SSA ALJs reported that they were frequently asked to do things against their
better judgment, with another 13% saying they were asked to do so occasionally. 46
Again these responses are more negative than the past responses. 47
Responses from the AJs were more positive than those from the ALJs. About
three-quarters reported that they were never or rarely asked do things in their
work that were against their better judgment. 48 Most of the rest said they were
only sometimes asked to do so and only about 4% said they were often or usually
asked to do so. Again, the group with less structural protection seemed less anxious.
Note also that the anxiety is not generalized. From discussion with ALJ s, I
have determined that the problems are particularized. 49 Looking at the variety
of the responses to questions about independence combined with interviews, I
have concluded that it is likely that problems are agency, or perhaps even individual, specific. If so, across-the-board solutions are less likely to confront the tensions
that raise anxiety concerning independence. Solutions capable of sensitivity to
individual circumstances seem much more appropriate. As suggested above, one
such approach might be to create an administrative adjudicator ombudsman office
to deal with these individual problems.
AssuRING ADEQUATE AND HoNEST PERFORMANCE OF
THE AssiGNED juDGING FuNCTION
Starting with the Carter administration, when the responsibility of the administrative judiciary shifted dramatically to implementation of entitlement programs,
efforts have been made to assure adequate, sensitive and honest performance of
the judging function. 50 Before that time, most ALJ s presided over massive regula-

44. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 15e.
45. 1992 ALJ Survey, SSA only, supra note 20, response 15e.
46. 1992 ALJ Survey, non-SSA, supra note 21, response 15e.
47. The GAO Study also attempted to measure the negative impact of certain aspects of the job.
GAO STUDY, supra note 10, response 44. ALJs then almost never worried about being asked to do
things that were against their better judgment. About 80% responded that they were never or rarely
asked to do so; whereas about 5% said they were often or usually asked to do so. !d., response 44.
48. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 27e.
49. Such discussion is the best information available because, in order to maintain anonymity,
we could not ask for more agency-specific responses and hence we do not know where the anxiety
resides.
50. CoFER STUDY, supra note 16, at 75-107.
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tory cases in which the private respondent was much better represented than the
agency and usually had considerable power. In short, interested parties could
protect themselves. The shift in the dominant administrative function put citizens
at risk who lacked these types of protection.
The agencies involved in these functions have continually searched for management methods in an effort to protect the public from ALJ misconduct. The ALJ s
have resisted such efforts for both good and bad reasons. The reality is that
performance management is increasingly important as the disadvantaged and
powerless appear more often before administrative presiding officials. But, the
countervailing reality is that the agencies face considerable disadvantages in performance management of presiding officials.
Still, it must be noted that presiding officials' view of agency management type
relationships may be more ambiguous than alleged. The 1992 ALJ Survey asked
whether current ALJ s were confronted with "too close supervision. " 51 Almost
90% of the ALJ s found that the prospect of excessive supervision was either not
a problem or not applicable. 52 The current SSA ALJs found close supervision to
be a slightly more frequent problem than non-SSA ALJs. 53 Nearly 80% of the
AJs reported that excessive supervision was not a problem, with most of the
54
remainder reporting that it was only sometimes a problem.
Presiding officials' view of institutional interference were also ambiguous. About
61% of the ALJs found that agency interference was a problem, with 26% finding
it to be a frequent problem. 55 Again, however, AJs seemed to have less problems
with interference than ALJs. About two-thirds of the AJs disagreed that agency
interference was a problem and only 11 % strongly agreed and another 23% agreed. 56
When asked about overburdening caseload and pressure to make quicker decisions, ALJs found these to be a problem, with 34% finding caseload a frequent
problem and 40% finding pressure to make quicker decisions a frequent problem. 57
Pressure on output is perceived as much more of a problem in the SSA than in
other agencies, with 41% of the SSA ALJ s finding caseload a frequent problem
and 54% of them finding pressure to make faster decisions a frequent problem. 58
59
AJ s were slightly less concerned with pressure for quicker decisions, and were
60
slightly more concerned with too great a caseload.
Nonetheless, both groups indicated considerable satisfaction with their jobs.
Alarming, however, is that satisfaction among ALJs seems to be going down

51. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 141.
52. !d., response 141. In contrast, nearly all the ALJs found this not to be a problem a decade
ago. BURGER STUDY, supra note 11, at 365.
53. Compare 1992 ALJ Survey, SSA only, supra note 20, response 141 with 1992 ALJ Survey,
non-SSA, supra note 21, response 141 (4% SSA only; 3% non-SSA).
54. 1992 Aj Survey, supra note 3, response 241.
55. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 23a.
56. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 26a.
57. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, responses 14c, g.
58. 1992 ALJ Survey, SSA only, supra note 20, responses 14c, g.
59. 1992 AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 24g.
60. !d., response 24c.
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even though their status, privileges, compensation and structural protection are
increasing. Burger found that the ALJs were generally satisfied with their job.
Over 97% were satisfied with their position and duties and over three-quarters
of these were very satisfied. 61 About 94% were satisfied with the substantive area
of law and 77% with the conditions of employment. 62 The 1992 ALJ Survey
found that only 65% reported that they were very satisfied with their jobs, but
most of the remainder said they were somewhat satisfied. 63 Nearly all were satisfied
with the nature of their duties, with 81% being very satisfied. 64 Almost all were
satisfied with the substantive area of the law. 65 However, over half were either
not satisfied or only somewhat satisfied with the conditions of employment. 66 The
responses for SSA ALJs vary little from the overall responses. 67
A] s seemed to be more satisfied with their jobs. 68 Virtually all, 99%, felt satisfied
with their duties, with 77% being very satisfied. 69 Nearly 100% were satisfied
with the substantive area of law, with 75% very satisfied. 70 About 80% were
satisfied with conditions of employment but only 34% were very satisfied. 71 In
sum, 97% were satisfied overall. 72 However, the AJs divided at about one-third
each among strongly agree, agree, or disagree as to whether a serious problem
existed for the following conditions: lack of status, poor image, inadequate hearing
facilities and staff support, poor salaries, lack of perquisites, and need for increase
in judicial powers. 73 About two-thirds of the AJ s were at least sometimes bothered
by the perception that others who performed the same work received more deference, with over 45% thinking that occurred often or always. 74
I draw three conclusions from these responses, which influence the reform
proposals outlined above. First, the tension over performance management, here
as elsewhere, is inevitable, but this kind of management is more often accepted
by presiding officials than some assert. Second, here, as elsewhere, the outward
manifestations of this tension are very individualized and must be met with mechanisms that can offer individualized solutions. Third, the structural and formalized
solutions are not as effective as less formal approaches.
The solution to the management problems the ALJ s consistently prefer is an
ALJ pool. The 1992 ALJ Survey found that 79% wanted separation from the
agency. 75 Seventy-six percent thought the absence of a corps was a problem. 76
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

BuRGER STuov, supra note II, at 86-87.
!d. at 86-87.

1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 22d.
/d., response 22a.
/d., response 22c.
!d., response 22b.
1992 ALJ Survey, SSA only, supra note 20, response 22.
AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 25.
!d., response 25a.
/d., response 25c.
!d., response 25b.
/d., response 25d.
/d., responses 26c-h.
!d., response 27j.
1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 23i.
/d., response 23k.
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The ALJs' position has not changed in a decade. The GAO Study found that
73% of the ALJs agreed to a great extent or better that an independent corps
would be an improvement. 77 The Cofer Study found that 83% of the SSA ALJs
favored the ALJ corps idea. 78 The Burger Study found nearly 70% favored an
independent corps. 79
I, like many others, find the ALJ pool solution misdirected and more likely to
aggravate problems than solve them. The ALJ s want to combine to further insulate
themselves from oversight. The presiding officers need more management, not
insulation. Still, the most effective management cannot generally be performed
by the agency. Thus, I recommend performance management by periodic evaluation by independent but not permanent panels. Not surprisingly, ALJs do not
like such reforms. For example, the GAO survey found that most ALJs would
not favor a system with set terms and renewal upon a review by an independent
panel of attorneys. 80
MoNITORING PoLICY INTEGRITY

Even more sensitive than performance management is the process of monitoring
policy integrity. Presiding officials see themselves as adjudicators and not as policymakers. Nonetheless, they implement agency policy and hence the agency's
policy choices have no effect unless the agency can assure that the presiding officials
are faithful to those choices. Agencies increasingly complain that some presiding
officials consistently ignore agency policy choices.

Failure to Assure Policy Integrity
Both types of presiding officials found that policymaking, or furthering a policy
agenda, was not one of their roles. 81 Moreover, they claimed not to seek to bring about
policy change. 82 Factors which might be considered somewhat less policy neutralbalancing interests, protecting public interest and clarifying agency policy-found

77. GAO STUDY, supra note 10, response 7-1.
78. CoFER STUDY, supra note 16, at 227.
79. BuRGER STUDY, supra note 11, at 414.
80. GAO STUDY, supra note 10, response 12. The GAO Study also found that about 85% of the
ALJ s disagree with the proposal for set terms for ALJ s. !d., response 11.
81. Most ALJ sin the 1992 ALJ Survey rated influence and furthering policy goals as unimportant,
with most of the remainder rating these factors as only somewhat important. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra
note 3, at responses 20g, h. The 1992 ALJ Survey found that over 91% believed making policy not
part of their job and two-thirds believed educating the public not part of their job. !d., responses 9i,
j. Most ALJs in the Burger Study also rated commitment to policy goals and desire to have influence
as not important, with most of the remainder rating those factors as only moderately important.
BuRGER STUDY, supra note 11, at 78, 289.
Similarly, over half of the Ajs rated these two as of little or no importance, with most of the
remainder rating them as only moderately important. Four Ajs ranked policy goals and only one
ranked having influence as first. AJ Survey, supra note 3, responses 21g, h. Only 10% ranked policy
goals and having influence within the top three functions of their office. !d., response 21.
82. The 1992 ALJ Survey found that 2% of the current ALJ s frequently suggest policy changes
and another 22% occasionally do so. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 10k. Ajs were slightly
more likely to do so with 54% reporting that they rarely or never did so and 44% reporting that
they did so occasionally. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 13k.
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a rather ambiguous response. One can conclude, however, that few regarded these
activities as very important. 83 Our AJ study arrived at much the same results. 84 AJs
also did not consider making agency policy as part of their job. 85 Eighty-six percent
said that their job did not include making policy to a significant extent and most of
the rest said their job included policymaking only to some extent. 86
On the other hand, a very large percentage of ALJ s found their job to a great
extent involved'' applying'' agency policy. 87 About three-quarters of the AJ s found
that their job involved to a great extent applying agency policies and regulations. 88
Still, we found the ALJ s surprisingly resistent to the idea that they were required
to follow the agency policy. This absence of commitment to agency policy decisions
creates serious potential unfairness. 89 This resistance, however, might have been
directed at less formal policy pronouncements. The 1992 ALJ Survey found that
they considered agency regulations as the primary source of policy direction.
Ninety-five percent of the ALJ s considered such regulations were very important
to their decisions, with almost all of the rest finding regulations somewhat important.90 Nearly 90% of the AJs felt that agency regulations were very important
to their decisions and the rest thought those regulations were moderately important. 91 About half of the AJ s believed they had the same duty as ALJ s to follow
agency policy but about 28% thought they had less of a duty to do so. 92
83. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, responses 9h-l. The related activity of interpreting statutes
was considered moderately important by almost 90% of the ALJs. !d., response 9f.
84. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 15.
85. !d., response 15.
86. About a third thought their job involved to a great extent and another third to some extent
"clarifying" agency policy. !d., response 15. About half thought that their job did not involve protecting the public interest. !d., response 15. They also considered the related activity of interpreting
statutes as part of their job. !d., response 15.
87. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, responses 9d, e.
88. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 15.
89. Some ALJs make little effort to understand and consistently apply agency policy. The 1992
ALJ Survey found that 21% of the current ALJs consult with superiors about difficult cases. 1992
ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response !Oc. SSA ALJs are slightly more likely to do so that non·SSA
ALJs. About a third of all ALjs consult with other ALJs either during or before a hearing but few
do so frequently. !d., responses !Of, g.
A little less than 50% of the Ajs reported that they rarely or never consulted with superiors about
difficult cases. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 13e. But over a third did so occasionally and 17%
did so frequently. !d., response 13e. About half of the AJ s occasionally consulted with other AJ s prior
to a hearing with 29% doing so frequently. !d., response 13f. About 40% of the Ajs occasionally
consult with other Ajs during a hearing and a third do so frequently. !d., response 13g. Ajs seem
more willing to seek advice especially from their peers.
Burger's inquiries regarding "patterns of communication" suggest that ALJs do not often seek
outside advice on difficult cases. Since the difficulty of a case is likely to stem from the closeness of
the policy question, this inquiry suggests that ALJs tend to resolve ambiguous policy questions themselves. Very few of them consulted either the chief ALJ or other ALJs for help with such cases.
This information suggests that ALJs are inclined to resolve individual controversy as best they can
and let the review stages of the adjudicative process resolve the policy questions. Yet, the GAO Study
found that ALJ s rarely engaged in research on agency policy, legal precedent or technical issues.
They almost never did so regarding short cases and did so only about a third of the time in long
cases. GAO STUDY, supra note 10, response 13-16.
90. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 16b.
91. A] Survey, supra note 3, response 16b.
92. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 28.
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On the other hand, while the ALJs considered themselves bound by agency
regulation, they did not feel constrained by less formal expressions of policy. 93
The failure to heed official public statements of policy violates the presiding officials' own view that they should not engage in policymaking. More importantly,
as the agency is bound by nonlegislative policy pronouncements, so too are its
adjudicators (unlike judges). That is, if they ignore the agency statements of
policy, not only are the adjudicators arrogating to themselves a policymaking
function but they are violating the law. 9"
Thus, the agencies have a legitimate need to monitor faithfulness to its policy.
The challenge is to create a mechanism for assuring policy integrity without creating the appearance of interfering in individual determinations.

Absence of Clear Policy Expression Aggrevates the Problem
To some extent, the problem may involve inadequate communication as well
as ineffective monitoring. One of the most pressing problems identified by both
groups was the absence of policy guidance.
The 1992 ALJ Survey found that current ALJ s saw the lack of policy direction
to be a problem. Thirty-five percent thought it was occasionally a problem and
another 9% regarded it a frequent problem. 95 Two-thirds of the AJ s reported
that lack of policy direction from the agency was not a problem but a third did
find this to be either sometimes or frequently a problem. 96 About a quarter of
the AJs agreed or strongly agreed that inadequate policy guidance was a problem
at their agencies. 97

Can Administrative Review Assure Policy Integrity?
The traditional legal approach to policy integrity is through review by a superior
adjudicative authority. For several reasons, some involving the presiding officials'
attitudes and others simple practicality, administrative review is inadequate for this
purpose in many administrative programs, particularly mass justice programs. 98
The opinions of the administrative review authority are one avenue of communication between the presiding officials and the agency policymakers but many practical
factors diminish the effectiveness of such communication. 99 In mass justice systems
93. !d., responses 16h, i.
94. For an excellent and complete discussion of this law, see Joshua Shwartz, The Irresistible Force
Meets the Immovable ObJect: Estoppel Remedies for an Agenry 's Violation of Its Own Regulations or Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 653 (1992).
95. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 14e.
96. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 24e.
97. !d., response 26i.
98. The 1992 ALJ Survey found that about one-third of the ALJs were bothered by too much
review. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 15d. About three-quarters of the AJs were rarely
or never bothered about this and only 10% of the AJ s were often bothered by too much review. AJ
Survey, supra note 3, response 27d. ALJs think that administrative review causes unreasonable delay.
GAO STuDY, supra note 10, response 16-2.
99. Burger offered these observations about the practicality of administrative review:
[H]eavy caseloads have an impact on the uniformity of the law. Just as busy appellate courts
provide only limited supervision of the lower courts' work, so too are agency reviewing authorities
constrained by the pressure of numbers from scrutinizing all ALJ decisions .... Less is known
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which now dominate administrative adjudications, concepts of precedent or even
consistency have little practical meaning. For this reason, it is useful to note the
difference perceived by SSA ALJ sand non-SSA ALJ s in the influence of prior agency
decisions. The 1992 ALJ Survey found that nearly all non-SSA ALJs believed that
published agency opinions were important, with 84% saying they were very important.100 On the other hand, SSA ALJs rated such opinions important less often,
with only 58% considering those opinions to be very important. 101
In addition, administrative review authorities are not primarily concerned with
102
monitoring policy integrity. The ALJs apparently perceive that the review authority focused on fact-finding, either interpreting the same facts differently or
finding other facts to be determinative. 103 The GAO found that most reversals
were the result of a different interpretation of the factual record. 104
ALJ s do not feel they receive adequate feedback on policy type issues from the
administrative review authority. 105 The 1992 ALJ Survey found that nearly half
of the ALJs thought the lack of clear standards for review was a problem. 106 A
quarter of the AJ s responded that the absence of review standards was either
sometimes or frequently a problem. 107 Still, almost three-quarters believed that
lack of agency standards for review of their decisions was not a problem. 108
about the basis on which agency heads select cases for discretionary review [than appellate courts],
a matter complicated by differences in agency structure and procedures. Nonetheless, in most of
the agencies the majority of ALJ decisions are not reviewed and become the final agency decisions.
The degree of independent judgment they exercise is thus of paramount importance for ALJs and
for other federal judges as well. BuRGER STUDY, supra note II, at 362.
100. 1992 ALJ Survey, non-SSA only, supra note 21, response 16d. About 90% of the AJs found
published agency opinions to be very important to their decisions. 1992 AJ Survey, supra note 3,
response 16d.
101. 1992 ALJ Survey, SSA only, supra note 20, response 14d. The SSA mass justice situation
might explain efforts towards more manageable communication of authority in that agency. Cofer
found that SSA ALJ s favored an effort to create a system of organizing representative cases in order
to make available a practical method for using prior decisions in the SSA context. CoFER STUDY,
supra note 16, at 169. The impracticality of systematic access to these decisions may be one major
cause for this perception.
102. See Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Kaplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation
and Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 199, 284 (1990).
103. This is interesting since in many mass justice programs the ALJs hold hearings as appeals
of decisions reached at some other level. The record compiled at this other level is often important.
However, three-quarters of all ALJs felt that the record was not adequate to support the decision at
the keep level, with 39% finding it was frequently not adequate. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3,
response II a. About three-quarters also thought that the record was not adequate to prepare them
for their hearing, with 44% finding this frequently occurred. !d., response 11 b.
SSA ALJs reported an even poorer performance at the other level. Ninety-three percent found the
record inadequate to support the decision at the keep level, with over half finding the record frequently
inadequate for that purpose. 1992 ALJ Survey, SSA only, supra note 20, response I Ia. Ninety-two
percent found the record inadequate to prepare them for their hearing, with 56% finding the record
frequently inadequate for that purpose. !d., response II b.
104. The GAO Study found that review authorities rarely found the ALJs misapplied the law or
committed factual error. GAO STUDY, supra note 10, response 41.
105. The GAO Study found that less than 60% of the ALJs perceived that they receive adequate
feedback and over 30% of the ALJs reported no feedback. !d., response 40.
I 06. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 14f.
I 07. !d., response 24f.
108. !d., response 24f.
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As might be expected, ALJs may believe that those conducting the administrative review do not have superior judgment or competence. The 1992 ALJ Survey
found that 62% of the current ALJ s thought that those who review their work were
not nearly as qualified as they, with 29% frequently thinking so. 109 Seventy-four
percent of the current SSA ALJ s thought that officials who review their work
110
were not nearly as qualified as they, with 31% frequently thinking so.
In addition, the 1992 ALJ Survey found that 62% of the ALJ s thought that
review by unqualified persons was a problem, with 33% thinking this was frequently a problem. 111 The current SSA ALJs found this to be more of a problem
than current non-SSA ALJs. 112
Only about half the AJs believed that those who review their work were not
nearly as qualified as they are. 113 A quarter sometimes held that belief and 14%
often or always believed that way. 114 However, nearly two-thirds reported that
115
review by persons who they thought were unqualified was not a problem.

More Systemic Approach Assuring Policy Integrity is Necessary
The nature of review itself, however, prevents it from assuring policy uniformity
and consistency in many administrative programs. Review is reactive and individualized. That means policy integrity protection depends on individual champions.
Moreover, where the review authority is handling thousands of cases, the review
authority does not have the time or resources to engage in more generalized policy
considerations. Where review generates thousands of opinions, those opinions
cannot be read, much less applied.
Another ACUS study found that administrative review in mass justice systems,
if approached in the traditional way, are very ineffective monitors of policy integrity.116 While that study recommended reforms in such systems to allow these
authorities to have a strong policy guidance role, absent s11ch reforms, or even
with them, review cannot protect the public from consistent policy deviations by
individual presiding officials.
Reform of the administrative judiciary must include finding workable methods for doing so. Generalized agency efforts to assure policy integrity, however,
have created tensions. The present ACUS recommendation admonished ALJs
of their duty here and hoped that this could be accomplished informally by
the chief ALJs. 117 I conclude, based on statements made to the study group,
that this method will not be adequate. Therefore, I recommend that the periodic

109. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 15i.
110. 1992 ALJ Survey, SSA only, supra note 20, response 14i.
111. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 14i.
112. Compare 1992 ALJ Survey, SSA only, supra note 20, response 14i with 1992 ALJ Survey,
non-SSA, supra note 21, response 14i (74% SSA only; 40% non-SSA).
113. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 27i.
114. /d., response 27i.
115. /d., response 24i.
116. See generally Koch & Kaplow, supra note 102.
117. The ACUS Study recommends discipline of ALJ s for ''a clear disregard of or pattern of
nonadherence to properly articulated and disseminated rules, procedures, precedents, and other
agency policy." 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-7(III)(B)(3)(1993).
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evaluation suggested above include consideration of faithfulness to the law and
agency policy.
EFFECTIVENESS OF PRESIDING OFFICIAL PROBITY AND RESOLVE AS A SAFEGUARD

Much stronger than any structural safeguards is the protection created by presiding officials' probity and resistance to distortions of the proper working of the
system. Our survey, as did the others, discovered an overwhelming commitment
to personal and systemic integrity.

Commitment to Personal Integrity
We asked the current ALJs which words best describe their role. Ninety-six
responded that' 'judge/adjudicator'' best described their role. 118 The terms' 'decision-maker" and "fact-finder" also received more than 90%. 119 Few current
ALJs described their role as "cog" or "referee." 120 Most thought their role was
"important," with 62% thinking that term very aptly described their role. 121
We asked the same question of AJ s, again with similar results. 122 Virtually all
thought very appropriate a description of themselves as "judge/adjudicator,"
"decision-maker" and "fact-finder. " 123 Nearly 90% thought they were "important'' but 31% felt that description was only somewhat appropriate. 124 Perhaps
more telling is the fact that three-quarters thought a description as a "cog" was
inappropriate and only 3% thought that description very appropriate. 125
The 1992 ALJ Survey found that 89% of the ALJs rated independence as a
very important factor and most of the remainder rated it important. 126 The views
of AJ s is much the same: About 82% rated independence of the job as very
important and 97% rated it as at least moderately important. 127 In short, administrative presiding officials find independence very important.
Thus, it is encouraging that presiding officials generally found that "independent" aptly described their role. In fact, 90% of ALJ s said that "independent"
very much described their role and the remainder found that term somewhat
descriptive. 128 Noteworthy is the fact that 90% of the SSAALJs said that ''independent'' very much described their role and the remainder found that term somewhat
descriptive. 129 AJ s also felt that "independent" described their role. 130
118. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 21a.
119. !d., responses 21d, e.
120. !d., responses 21g, h.
121. !d., response 21 b.
122. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 23.
123. !d., response 23. We asked of current ALJs the open ended question: "How would you
describe your role in the administrative process.'' Almost all ALJ s responded that they were ''judges.''
1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 6 (written comments on file with the author). We also asked
the same question of Ajs and they responded in much the same fashion. AJ Survey, supra note 3,
response 22 (on file with the author).
124. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 23b.
125. One of these described themselves as a "vital cog." !d., response 6 (written comments on
file with the author).
126. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 20a.
127. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 21 a.
128. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 21c.
129. !d., response 21c.
130. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 23.
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Attitude Towards External Activities
The surveys found some consensus on appropriate conduct in several areas.
The caution of both groups suggests a general regard for the dangers of outside
contacts and relationships.
The 1992 ALJ Survey found that current ALJ s rarely communicate about their
cases outside the agency, with only about 15% doing so even occasionally. 131 That
survey found that nearly half talk to agency staff about cases, with 22% frequently
doing so. 132 However, most thought social contacts with agency staff or private
attorneys was inappropriate but many thought this practice was somewhat appropriate. 133
A]s apparently believe they are under similar constraints. Over 90% rarely or
never had communications with those outside the agency about their cases. 134
Over half rarely or never had communication with the staff about a case, 135 but
29% occasionally had such communications and 14% had them frequently. 136
However, most Ajs thought that social contacts with agency attorneys or private
attorneys was at best only sometimes appropriate and about 40% thought that
such contacts were inappropriate. 137
Presiding officials also limited their lobbying activity. Nonetheless, most
thought suggesting procedural change and working for changes in substantive
policy were appropriate. 138 Most thought lobbying Congress on behalf of ALJ s
was appropriate. 139 About three-quarters thought suggesting proceedings, investigations, or study was appropriate. 140
A]s agreed as to permissible activities outside the adjudicative process. Nearly
90% thought suggesting procedural changes to the agency and about 70% thought
suggesting policy changes to the agency were at least appropriate. 141 About threequarters regarded suggesting other investigations or studies to the agency as at
least sometimes appropriate. 142 Some 70% thought lobbying Congress on behalf
of AJ s was at least sometimes appropriate. 143
Nearly all ALJs thought talking to the media about a case before, during, or
after the final decision, was inappropriate. 144 Almost none talk to the media about
131. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response lOj.
132. !d., response lOi.
133. !d., responses 24e, f.
134. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 13j.
135. !d., response 13i.
136. !d., response 13i.
137. !d., responses !Be, f. Those in the EOIR were particularly adamant about their distance from
immigration. (Their strong expression was no doubt generated by a mistake in our characterization
of them on our survey form.)
138. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, responses 24g, h.
139. !d., response 24i.
140. !d., response 24j.
141. AJ Survey, supra note 3, responses 18g-j.
142. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, responses 18g-j.
143. !d., response 18i.
144. !d., responses 24b-d.
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their decisions. 145 Almost all AJ s thought that talking to the media during the
hearing was inappropriate. 146 About three-quarters believed talking to the media
after the case was still inappropriate. 147 The 1992 ALJ Survey found that ALJs do
not participate in the decision after the hearing. Few participated in oral argument,
talked to agency staff, helped prepare documents, or observed oral argument. 148 A
very few supplied written clarification and studied briefs. 149 The only post-hearing
activity that a significant number engaged in was assisting in writing the final
agency decision. 150
A]s' conduct after their decision was similarly isolated. Nearly all responded
that they did not participate in oral argument. 151 More than 90% reported that
they rarely or never supplied written clarification, talked with agency staff, helped
prepare documents, or observed oral argument. 152 About a quarter reported that
they frequently assisted in writing the final opinion. 153 About a third at least
occasionally study appellate briefs but only 8% frequently did so. 154

Conscientious Performance
Our survey also found considerable support for the idea that presiding officials
are conscientious. Of the current ALJs, 54% frequently read relevant court opinions and another 41% occasionally did so. 155 Fifty-four percent frequently read
final agency decisions and 33% read those decisions on occasion. 156 A little over
half read commercial services, with only 16% frequently doing so. 157 About twothirds read decisions of other ALJs, with 26% doing so frequently. 158 Less than
half consulted with other ALJ s. 159 The 1992 ALJ Survey, however, found some
drop off in background preparation. 160
Our study found that many AJs engaged in background preparation. Nearly
all read final agency decisions frequently. 161 About 90% read decisions of other
presiding officers. 162 And nearly all read federal court decisions at least occasion-

145. !d., response 13b.
146. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 18b.
147. !d., responses 18c, d.
148. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, responses 13a, d, f, g.
149. !d., responses 13c, e.
150. !d., response 13h.
151. AJ Survey, supra note 3, responses 17a.
152. !d., responses 17c, d, f, g.
153. I d., response 17h.
154. !d., response 17e.
155. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response tOe.
156. !d., response lOb.
15 7. !d., response 1Od.
158. ld., response lOa.
159. ld., responses lOf, g.
160. Cj BuRGER STUDY, supra note 11, at 224; see also SHARON STUDY, supra note 16, responses
122, 125, 126.
161. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 13b.
162. !d., response 13a.
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ally, with three-quarters reading them frequently. 163 Over 80% used commercial
services or industry publications at least occasionally. 164
ALJ s also engaged in general professional development. About three-quarters
of the current ALJs reported attending professional meetings and seminars but
only 8% do so frequently. 165 Over a third talked to the private bar about the
agency, with only 3% doing so frequently. 166 Many AJ s engage in more general
professional contacts. Almost half at least occasionally talked to members of the
private bar about agency procedures. 167 Over 90% reported attending professional
meetings or seminars although only 20% did so frequently. 168
It seems, however, that the agencies do little to assist the presiding officials in
continuing their training and education. As budgets tighten, what little is available
in this regard disappears. Certainly if the presiding officials have the will, the
government should give them the opportunity to continue to improve.
DoEs THE SYSTEM RECRUIT THE RIGHT ExPERIENCE, TRAINING, AND
PERSONALITY TYPES

Unlike other legal systems, ours converts practicing attorneys into judges; in
particular, we use former litigators as trial judges. In other systems, judges are
trained for that purpose because those systems recognize that judging is a quite
different function from advocacy.
Whatever the validity of our approach generally, it is not sound for the administrative judiciary. First, administrative presiding officials are primarily factfinders
(rather than procedural referees) and should be knowledgeable in the relevant
disciplines. Second, most administrative presiding officials now deal with the lower
and powerless strata of our society. They need special skills to do so with fairness
and sensitivity. We have not been careful in assuring that we recruit those with
these skills and aptitudes.

Formal Qualifications are Adequate
The quality of the presiding officials as a group is impressive and there is little
difference between the qualifications of ALJ sand AJ s. The 1992 ALJ Survey found
that 93% of the current ALJ s graduated in the top half of their class. 169 About 23%
graduated in the top 10% and about 60% in the top quarter. 170 About 17% of the
ALJs were members oflaw review. 171 By comparison, the AJ population surveyed
had slightly less impressive credentials but still represent an impressive group. As
with ALJ s, almost 90% of the AJ s graduated in the top half and nearly 50% in the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
1 71.

!d., response 13c.
!d., response !3d.
1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response tOo.
!d., response 10m.
AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 13m.
!d., response 13o.
1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 36.
/d., response 36.
!d. , response 3 7.
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top quarter. They were slightly below the ALJs in the other categories. About 20%
graduated in the top 10%; 172 over 12% were members oflaw review; 173 and 13%
of the AJ s graduated from the ''prestige'' law schools. 174
Nonetheless, the 1992 ALJ Survey found that nearly three-quarters ofthe ALJ s
felt that mediocrity among ALJ s was a problem but only 17% thought it was a
very serious problem. m Most AJ s did not think mediocrity of AJ s was a serious
problem but 43% would at least agree it was a problem. 176 As might be expected,
most of both groups believed they were qualified. 177
The experience of the ALJ population is more diverse than many believe. 178
The 1992 ALJ Survey found that 36% classified their primary professional experience as private practice. 179 Those coming out of private practice had rarely ap180
peared before either the employing agency or other federal agencies.
They
181
varied in age more than one might expect as well.

172. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 3.
173. /d., response 4.
174. /d., response 2. Although such lists are always disputable, for purposes of comparison, we
used the Cartter Report list relied on by Dr. Burger. Those 15 prestigious law schools are: Chicago,
Columbia, Cornell, Duke, Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, N.Y.U., Pennsylvania, Stanford,
Texas, University of California at Berkeley, UCLA, Virginia, and Yale. BuRGER STUDY, supra note
11, at 107, 107 n.c.
175. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 23g.
176. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 26g.
177. The GAO Study found that about 85% said that "rarely" they felt they were not fully qualified
to handle their jobs with another 11% having these feelings sometimes or rather often. GAO STUDY,
supra note 10, response 44-7. In the 1992 ALJ Survey, no ALJs reported that they frequently felt
they were unqualified and only 2% reported that they occasionally had those feelings. 1992 ALJ
Survey, supra note 3, response 15g. It is difficult to interpret this change of attitude.
Most AJs also feel they are qualified to do their job. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 27g. About
16% rarely or sometimes felt they were not qualified. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 27g.
This reflects a healthy state of affairs that may no longer exist with ALJ s. AJ s generally have confidence
in their abilities and yet sometimes contemplate possible weaknesses.
178. Although today ALJs might be lumped together as "old, white men," in fact they come from
a culturally diverse background and many from groups who were the object of discrimination in the
legal profession of their generation.
Any number of sources support the conclusion that the ALJ corps is overwhelmingly white and
male. The 1992 ALJ Survey found that 94% were male and 6% female. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra
note 3, response 26. It found that 94% were white, 3% Hispanic and the remaining 3% divided
evenly among blacks, Asians, and Native Americans. /d., response 27. Our survey of the AJ population
found that it is also predominantly white and male. About 80% were male and about 84% are white.
AJ Survey, supra note 3, response Sa. Nine percent were Black, 3% Hispanic, 3% Asian and 1%
Native American. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 8b.
The Burger study suggests considerable diversity in social status and shows considerable social
mobility. Burger found that, while only a quarter came from blue-collar worker backgrounds, in over
two-thirds of their homes, the primary wage earner did not have a college degree and over one-third
did not have a high school diploma. BuRGER STUDY, supra note 11, at 113, 115. Minority religious
groups are also substantially overrepresented relative to society in general. !d. at 117.
179. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 25a.
180. BuRGER STUDY, supra note 11, at 141.
181. The 1992 ALJ Survey found that 94% of the current ALJs were over 45. 1992 ALJ Survey,
supra note 3, response 5. These were spread fairly evenly among 5 year periods. Seventy percent had
served less than 15 years. /d., response 2. Burger concluded that "our data showed little evidence
of a group of gray eminences who had become calcifi~d over long years of being on the bench."
BURGER STUDY, supra note 11, at 143.
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Our AJ survey asked more open-ended questions about the nature of the AJs'
primary professional experience. Still, the results indicate considerable diversity.
Their answers fell into 57 categories. 182 Although some of these categories were
quite similar, overall they demonstrated a significant range. The vast majority
listed legal experience, but other occupations were represented, including engineer, scientist, physicist, university professor, and various types of medical professions. About 23% called themselves former government attorneys, with several
of the other categories suggesting government experience. About 8% were either
judges or examiners. Our survey also found a wide range both in terms of years
at the agency and in service as an AJ. 183

Overcommitment to Litigation Experience
The 1992 ALJ Survey found that nearly 80% characterized their experience
as litigation. 184 Nearly all of those responding to the 1992 ALJ Survey considered
trial experience as at least important, with 72% finding it very important. 185
Nonetheless, the characterization of their role suggests that litigation experience
does not provide the crucial training and background. ALJs found factfinding
and making credibility determinations to be the most important parts of their
jobs. 186 AJs found factfinding to be the most important and making credibility
determinations third most important. 187 Very few members of either group characterized their role as "referee. " 188 Nor do the key skills listed by both sets of
presiding officials suggest that trial experience insures the relevant skills. Nearly
all current ALJ s rated analytical skills very importane 89 and nearly all would rate
writing ability as at least important. 190 Our AJ study showed that nearly all AJ s
rated analytical skill and reasoning ability as indispensable. 191 They also all rated
192
writing ability as at least important, with 73% finding it indispensable.
Litigation training and experience would not appear the best indicator of these
crucial skills. Surely, these skills could be acquired in any number of other ways.

182. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 9.
183. Three·quarters had been at the agency from 1·11 years with fairly even distribution among
those years. /d., response II. Similarly about three·quarters had been AJs for 1-11 years with fairly
even distribution among those years. /d., response II. (The longest tenure was 31 years.)
The average age of a sitting AJ was 49. /d., response 7. However, the range was fairly great with
a standard deviation of8.7. The youngest was 30 and the oldest was 74. About 60% of them were
between 41 and 51.
184. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 25b.
185. /d., response 17h.
186. /d., ranking in question 9. Guaranteeing due process was the third and, while more related
to litigation experience, such experience is not that important even to that part of the job.
187. AJ Survey, supra note 3, ranking in question 15. Guaranteeing due process was second but,
while more related to litigation experience, such experience is not that important even to that part
of the job.
188. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 21h; AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 23h.
189. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 17-1.
190. /d., response 17j.
191. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 20e.
192. /d., response 20j.
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The strong bias in favor of litigation experience no doubt eliminates candidates
who otherwise would be competitive in terms of these skills.
Significantly, only about 14% of the AJ s classified their experience as that of
a trial attorney with another 7% describing their experience as general practice. 193
Only 19% believed that trial experience was indispensable, and few thought it
important. 194
The strong bias in favor of litigation experience in the selection of ALJ s may
explain the growing commitment to formalism at the expense of flexible and
innovative processes. About half of the current ALJs thought compromise of
formal procedures was a problem and 13% thought it was frequently a problem. 195
One of the prior studies found that a large percentage, 66% , favored an administrative trial court, completely judicializing the administrative adjudicators. 196 On
the other hand, the AJs were not as committed to formalism. Over three-quarters
of the AJ s did not believe failure to follow formal procedures was a serious problem.197 Only 5% strongly agreed that it was a serious problem. 198
The justification for administrative adjudicative processes is the opportunity to
tailor the processes to the special procedural needs of each particular administrative
program. The Supreme Court and generations of commentators have supported
the advantages presented by this procedural flexibility. The presiding officials
indicated that they try not to be overly committed to formality but they believe
in formality. This attitude seems to be forcing more formality into many processes.

Undercommitment to Technical and Substantive Expertise
We asked the current ALJs to rank certain aspects of their function. The most
important part of the job, they reported, was marshalling the facts. 199 The most
important influences on their decisions, 78% said, were evaluation of the facts. 200
More to the point, 94% found applying substantive expertise a significant part
of the job, with 64% saying the job involved that function to a great extent. 201
Nearly all AJ s found that their job to a great extent involved factfinding202 and that
function was considered the most important. 203 Again, 89% considered applying
substantive expertise a significant part of the job, with 71% saying the job involved
that function to a great extent. 204 Over half of the AJ s thought the cases were
overly complex in the technical sense but only 5% thought that was frequently
a problem. 205
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

!d., response 9 (written comments on file with the author).
/d., response 20h.
1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 23f.
BURGER STUDY, supra note 11, at 414.
AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 26f.
!d. , response 26f.
1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 9.
/d., response 16.
/d., response 9e.
AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 15.
!d. , response 15.
/d., response 15e.
/d., response 24d.
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Yet, the survey responses suggest that the ALJs' view of the value of substantive
expertise is somewhat ambiguous. 206 Less than half of the current ALJ s considered
experience in the substantive area important, and an additional 28% found it
very import ant. 207 Overall, therefore, 76% found it at least somewhat important. 208
Technical expertise was also generally found important. Only a little over half
found technical expertise important and 24% found it very important. 209 On the
other hand, almost 90% of the AJs found experience in the substantive area at
least important and a third found it indispensable. 210 About 80% found technical
expertise at least important and about a quarter found it indispensable. 211
Given the nature of their job, more attention should be given to training presiding officials in the relevant technical areas. Perhaps a greater effort should be made
to recruit technical expertise. Indeed, it may be more important than litigation
experience in many programs.
The system should certainly assure that technical advice is readily available to
presiding officials. One of the arguments for housing the adjudicators in the relevant agency is access to expertise. The 1992 ALJ Survey found that most current
ALJs needed expert advice. 212 The SSA and non-SSA ALJs differed considerably.
Nearly all SSA ALJs required experts, with 80% doing so frequently; whereas
less than half of the non-SSA ALJs did so. 213 Nearly half of the AJs reported that
they at least occasionally required experts. 214 Only about 10% did so frequently. 215
Thus, presiding officials need expert staff support. The GAO Study found that
most ALJs thought improved administrative and/or technical support would improve the administrative process. 216

More Use of Expert Decisionmakers
Administrative law commentators often advocate incorporating experts into
the decisionmaking process. In some cases, members of particular disciplines
206. The Burger study also found that a very small percentage viewed such expertise as indispensable
but about a half viewed these as important. BuRGER STUDY, supra note 11, at 63. On the other
hand, one-third found substantive experience unimportant and over half found technical expertise
unimportant. /d. at 63.
207. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 17e.
208. See id., response 17e.
209. !d., response 17i.
210. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 20e.
211. !d., response 20i.
212. 1992 ALJ Survey, supra note 3, response 12c.
213. Compare 1992 ALJ Survey, SSA only, supra note 20, response 12c with 1992 ALJ Survey,
non-SSA only, supra note 21, response 12c.
214. AJ Survey, supra note 3, response 14c.
215. !d., response 14c. Cofer found that SSA ALJs considered government paid expert witnesses
to be as reliable as others. COFER STUDY, supra note 16, at 165. Because of the questions she asked
on this issue, the results are ambiguous. In the most pertinent part of the survey, she asked respondents
to agree or disagree with the following: "The ALJ should put more weight on the claimant's own
physician's diagnosis of the claimant than that of the state-paid consulting physician." /d. Her computation of the weighted answer was 35% agreeing but 38% disagreeing and another 26% neutral.
Perhaps, this indicates nothing more than a general practice ofjudging the credibility of these witnesses
as any others. /d.
216. GAO STUDY, supra note 10, response 7-9.
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should be the decisionmakers. We have not taken full advantage of this possibility.217
In many cases, it might make sense to use experts as decisionmakers or at least
make them part of the decisionmaking unit, as well as the information gathering
process. More flexibility should be built into the selection process to allow for
this reform.

Recruiting Judicial Personality
Assuring that citizens are satisfied with the administrative adjudicator is important. One key to their comfort level is the personality and behavior of the
presiding official. Yet, many do not take judicial attitude into the hearing room.
Unfortunately, the ACUS Study Group did not have the resources to systematically explore the views of those who appear or their representatives. However,
we received enough information from other sources to suggest a need to inquire
into this aspect of the system. My initial conclusion is that the system does not
do enough to assure that the administrative judiciary will be sensitive to those
who appear before it.
Of course, racial and gender bias cannot be tolerated. A recent GAO study
made a very strong case that Social Security ALJ s make racially biased decisions. 218
Witnesses before the ACUS study group also raised serious challenges of gender
bias. 219 The system must stamp out any such biases. The ombudsman and periodic
review schemes advocated here provide the method for determining the validity
of such charges against individual presiding officials.
A more subtle problem may be in the behavior of some ALJs. The way one
approaches the process of judging irrevocably affects the fairness and accuracy
of the ultimate determination. It is clear to me that a number of the present ALJ s
should not be in position of judging people. The selection process itself must be
made sensitive to behavior and personality factors. Perhaps, some very sophisticated behavioral testing in that process should be considered. The efficacy of such
testing, however, is well beyond my expertise.

Conclusion
The federal administrative judiciary is far from perfect and is in need of reform.
The first step is a shift in perspective from that of the presiding officials to that
of those who appear before the officials. The defects in the system look different
from that perspective, and the nature of the reform changes as well. The second
step is to look beyond traditional, legalistic structure and search for more practical,
human solutions.
217. Seelmproved Use of Medical Personnel in Social Security Disability Determinations, 1 C. F. R.
§ 305.89-10 (1989).
218. U.S. GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, SociAL SEcuRITY: RAciAL DIFFERENCES IN DISABILITY
DECISIONS WARRANTS fURTHER INVESTIGATION (1992).
219. Study Group Hearing, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 17, 1991) (statement of Eileen P. Sweeney,
Staff Attorney, National Senior Citizens Law Center).

